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INTRODUCTION
A signature on a petition page can have myriad meanings, depending on
the content and purpose of the specific petition. Signing "I oppose the war in
X" might be the act of a protestor wishing to demonstrate how unpopular a
war is. Signing a petition that reads "I want to invite Y as homecoming band"
might be the act of a student seeking to lobby school administrators. "I join
group Z" might be a simple membership rite or a voicing of support for an
embattled or unpopular organization. In contrast, signing a petition that states
"I support a ballot initiative to repeal a law" might be considered a regulated
part of the state or local legislative process. It is this last petition that is the
central inquiry of this Note: Are signatures gathered for direct democracy
initiatives part of the government lawmaking process and therefore subject to
transparency and disclosure laws? Or are they, like so many other petitions,
protected speech?
The central argument of this Note is that signatures on petitions as part of
ballot initiatives and similar processes can be subject to public scrutiny and
disclosure; they should not benefit from free speech protections allowing for
anonymity. Put differently, signatures used in direct democracy proceedings
should not be considered petitions or speech at all, but rather lawmaking. The
implications of this argument for future court decisions are far-reaching:
judges should not analyze disclosure of legislative petitions using strict scrutiny
under First Amendment doctrine but rather under a more deferential standard
of review similar to that applied to other state electoral regulations.'
This issue has vast real-world implications; speech activity benefits from
broad First Amendment protections while lawmaking and legislative
procedures are highly regulated. Moreover, ballot initiatives and other forms of
"direct democracy" play an increasingly prominent role in state and local
politics. At least twenty-seven states have provisions that make ballot
initiatives or popular legislative action possible through the collection of
1. Compare Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 75 (1976) (per curiam) (applying strict scrutiny in a
First Amendment analysis of an electoral disclosure provision), with Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428, 433 (1992) ("[T]o subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require
that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest . . . would tie
the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.").
2. See Kathleen Ferraiolo, Preserving the Initiative: State Legislative Response to Direct Democracy,
39 POLITY 425, 426 (2007). See generally PHILIP L. DUBoIs & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY
INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS (1998) (analyzing initiative lawmaking
across the country); JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE,
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signatures.' Ballot initiatives through signature collection on petitions are also
a feature of local government.4 While direct democracy initiatives often target
mundane issues like public spending or taxation,' they are also used to settle
state law on controversial national issues including gay rights, affirmative
action,7 and marijuana legalization." This Note's argument thus has significant
implications for the regulation of the direct democracy legislative processes that
already are, and surely will continue, defining the states' approaches to
pressing national issues.
Direct democracy processes were largely rejected at the Founding in favor
of representative democracy.' Nevertheless, direct democracy gained
popularity in the Progressive Era as a way to empower the people by giving
them an added check on their elected representatives or "big business" and "big
government" generally."o For example, the Washington State Constitution was
amended in 1912 to read:
The legislative authority of the state of Washington shall be vested in
the legislature . . . but the people reserve to themselves the power to
propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls,
3. See State I&R, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., http://www.iandrinstitute.org/
statewide i&r.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2011) (listing all of the states and providing
information about the type of direct democracy allowed in each state and the dates of
adoption); see also Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503,
1587-88 (1990); States That Allow for the Ballot Initiative Process, BALLOT INITIATIVE STRATEGY
CTR., http://www.ballot.org/page/-/ballot.org/maps/Initiative%20states.pdf (last visited
Feb. 23, 2011) (providing a map of states with popular legislative initiative options by
category).
4. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 293, 299.
5. See, e.g., William Yardley, Oregon: Voters Approve Tax Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at
Ai6.
6. See Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
6, 20o8, at Ai.
7. See Ethan Bronner, U. of Washington Will End Race-Conscious Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
7, 1998, at Ai2.
8. See Marc Lacey, Calfornia Rejects Marijuana Legalization as Nation Votes on Issues Big and
Small, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at P8.
9. See THE FEDERALIST No. io (James Madison) (discussing the virtues of representative
democracy).
lo. Kevin R. Johnson, A Handicapped, Not "Sleeping," Giant: The Devastating Impact of the
Initiative Process on Latina/o and Immigrant Communities, 96 CALIF. L. REv. 1259, 1260
(2008); see also THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 44-45 (1989); Paula Abrams, The Majority Will: A Case Study of
Misinformation, Manipulation, and the Oregon Initiative Process, 87 OR. L. REV. 1025, 1025-26
(20o8).
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independent of the legislature, and also reserve power, at their own
option, to approve or reject at the polls any act, item, section, or part of
any bill, act, or law passed by the legislature."
The right to legislate through initiative and referendum is neither
unrestricted nor constitutionally required." It should come as no surprise that
ballot initiatives are limited to eligible voters and required to conform to
jurisdiction-specific procedural guidelines." But to what extent can state or
local governments regulate petition-based ballot initiatives -especially with
regard to disclosure?
Using a First Amendment lens to analyze a state's ability to regulate the
legislative process will inevitably lead to confusion and misguided outcomes.
The goal of this Note is to distinguish between pure speech, which might
include a signature on a generic petition with no legislative implications, and
speech-like activity that forms part of the lawmaking process and should be
transparent and subject to disclosure.14 The states should be able to determine,
within broad constitutional bounds, the extent of the disclosure requirements.
11. WASH. CONST. art. 1I, § 1. Ballot initiatives have an obvious populist appeal but have been
criticized for undermining protections for minority groups. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins,
How Democratic Are Initiatives?, 72 U. COLO. L. REv. 983, 994 (2001); Johnson, supra note
io, at 1260-61; cf MATSUSAKA, supra note 2, at 113-14 (arguing that direct democracy does in
fact benefit majority interests). Ballot initiatives may also oversimplify complex, nuanced
policy questions by providing artificial binary choices. They have thus been attacked on
populist grounds for capturing a polity's preferences at a given time without considering the
polity's long-term interests. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy,
112 HARv. L. REV. 434, 448-52 (1998); David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?An Assessment
of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 13, 24 (1995) (highlighting the
role of money and capital interests in shaping direct democracy outcomes). The
constitutionality of referenda and initiatives has been questioned as well. See, e.g.,
Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 301-06 (arguing that initiatives are unconstitutional). Rather
than engaging the existing scholarly criticism of direct democracy in theory, this Note
focuses on the tension in practice between protecting direct democracy as speech and
regulating it as lawmaking.
12. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of Chusing Senators.").
13. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.72.100 (West 2005) (requiring that petitions be
printed in a particular format with space for not more than twenty signatures per page); id.
§ 29A.72.130 (requiring each signatory to "print his or her name, and the address, city, and
county at which he or she is registered to vote").
14. For the purposes of this Note, "lawmaking process" means a formal, official part of the
lawmaking procedure that is subject to state or local regulation. For more on why this
argument does not apply to voting, see infra Section W.A.
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The argument here is not for a specific policy approach to disclosure provisions
but rather for a distinction between lawmaking and speech.
This Note seeks to help alleviate the tension between anonymous speech
and disclosure in the context of direct democracy by analyzing a recent
Supreme Court case, historic practice, and judicial doctrine. Part I describes the
facts, procedural posture, and outcome of Doe v. Reed" to give context to the
broader theoretical argument in subsequent Parts. Part II reviews the history of
anonymous speech and public politics in the United States. This Part marshals
the practice, understanding, and experience of the Founding generation to
illustrate that the history of anonymous speech does not support efforts to
participate in modern-day lawmaking anonymously. On the contrary, a vibrant
history of transparent and public lawmaking bolsters the notion that direct
democracy initiatives should be subject to disclosure. Part III analyzes doctrine
at the intersection of free speech and election law to clarify precedential
principles and argue for disclosure. This Part shows why anonymous speech
doctrine does not and should not apply to direct democracy processes and why
disclosure doctrine does. Part IV weighs the evidence presented in the first
three Parts. Through prudential analysis, this Part considers the implications of
the Note's position and engages counterarguments.
1. DOE V. REED: ANONYMOUS SPEECH VERSUS LAWMAKING IN
PRACTICE
The Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to decide a case at the
heart of this Note's inquiry. Unfortunately, the opinion in that case does not
adequately resolve the issues germane to this Note. This Part briefly describes
the circumstances that brought Doe v. Reed to the Supreme Court. It then
analyzes the Court's decision in Reed and focuses on the ways in which the
Court neglected to resolve the core problem presented. The Justices in Reed did
not establish a clear rule of law that can resolve direct democracy cases certain
to emerge in the future. But first it is important to set out the facts.
In May 2009, the governor of Washington signed into law the so-called
"everything but marriage" bill that would allow for civil unions for gay
couples.' Just seven months later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
15- 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
16. See Doe v. Reed, 586 F. 3 d 671, 674-75 (9 th Cir. 2009), affd 130 S. Ct. 2811; Richard Roesler,
Gregoire Endorses Rights for Same-Sex Partnerships, SPOKESMAN-REv. (Spokane, Wash.), May
19, 2009, at Ai.
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Reed." In granting certiorari, the Court did not intend to speak to the issues
surrounding the national domestic partnership debate but rather to hear a
tangential issue arising out of the unique circumstances of the Washington
state initiative process. Reed presented a fascinating and complex First
Amendment constitutional challenge to a Washington state public disclosure
law.
After the "everything but marriage" bill was signed into law, a group called
Protect Marriage Washington (PMW) sought to roll back the gay rights
legislation through referendum. 8 PMW sought a 2009 ballot referendum on
the legislation so that the law would require voter approval before going into
effect." In order to initiate the referendum process, Washington law requires
that petitions must be filed with Washington's secretary of state; those
petitions must contain the valid signatures of registered Washington voters in
a number at least equal to four percent of the votes cast for governor in the
immediately preceding election."o Petitioners must request that each signatory
sign and print her name and write the address, city, and county in which she is
registered to vote.
Shortly after PMW submitted its petitions to Secretary of State Sam Reed,
his office received several requests, pursuant to Washington's Public Records
Act, for copies of the petitions themselves. 2 Through this kind of disclosure,
nongovernmental organizations have played a central role in detecting fraud.
PMW, together with two unnamed plaintiffs who were signatories of the
petitions, sought to enjoin release of the petitions, arguing that the disclosure
requirement was unconstitutional as applied to the petition signatories because
there was a reasonable probability that the referendum supporters "[would] be
17. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 1133.
18. See Reed, 586 F.3d at 675.
19. See Linda Greenhouse, Into the Closet, OPINIONATOR (Jan. 14, 2010, 9:34 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2olo/ol/14/into-the-closet.
20. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29 A.72.1 50 (West 2005).
21. Id. S 29A.72.1 3 o.
22. See Reed, 586 F. 3d at 675; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §5 42.56.ooi-.904 (West 2005).
The Washington Public Records Act is "itself the product of the public initiative process."
Greenhouse, supra note 19.
23. See, e.g., Nicole Fuller, Cordish Attacks Anti-Slots Petitions: Elections Board Failed To Check for
Fraud, Other Irregularities, Lawsuit Says, BALT. SUN, Feb. 24, 2010, at 2A (describing a fraud
investigation into a direct democracy petition drive that was initiated after nongovernmental
groups accessed the petitions); BALLOT INITIATIVE STRATEGY CTR., ABUSING DIRECT
DEMOCRACY: BAD ACTORS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING PROCESS (2007),
http://bisc.3cdn.net/fb3cd964499ff383ed bwm6i2dud.pdf (detailing numerous counts of
fraud in direct democracy proceedings).
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subjected to threats, harassment, and reprisals."" The district court granted
the petitioners a preliminary injunction preventing the Secretary of State from
releasing the petitions, but the Ninth Circuit overruled the district court on the
basis that the lower court had erroneously applied strict scrutiny." A few
months later, the plaintiffs sought and received a writ of certiorari from the
Supreme Court on whether the First Amendment rights to free speech and to
privacy require strict scrutiny of a state law compelling disclosure of identifying
information about petition signers.26 In addition, the Court agreed to consider
whether the lower court properly granted the preliminary injunction against
disclosure of the petitions. 7
This case provided the Court with the opportunity to resolve the tension
between competing election law doctrines: a right to anonymity" on the one
hand and compelled disclosure" on the other.3o In the context of Washington's
referendum, anonymous speech seems to conflict with disclosure, public
records, and freedom of information laws; there is a core tension between the
desire for free, anonymous political speech and open, transparent government.
Instead, the Court's resolution in Reed means that lower courts will have to use
a fact-bound, case-by-case process to determine whether petition signers will
be guaranteed anonymity.
An eight-Justice majority ruled in favor of Secretary of State Reed, rejecting
the facial challenge to the disclosure law, with seven Justices filing opinions.3
In essence, the Court held that disclosure of the identity of persons who sign
24. Reed, 586 F.3d at 675-76. However, the only evidence presented was hostile language
directed toward individuals gathering signatures on the petitions, not the signers themselves
whose anonymity was in question. See Brief for Respondent Washington Families Standing
Together at 36-38, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-559) (directly rebutting the
argument about threats of retaliation). For a discussion of case law on protection for
vulnerable groups, see infra Section I.A.
25. Reed, 586 F.3d at 681.
26. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (No. 09-559).
27. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2816-17.
28. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
29. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) ("The Government may regulate
corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements . . . ."); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding portions of the Federal Elections
Campaign Act mandating disclosure of campaign contributors).
30. See Richard M. Cardillo, Note, I Am Publius, and I Approve This Message: The Baffling and
Conflicted State of Anonymous Pamphleteering Post-McConnell, 8o NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1929
(2005) (explaining the tension in doctrine between defending anonymous speech and
upholding election transparency laws).
31. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811.
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petitions for ballot referenda does not normally violate the First Amendment.
However, the Court left open the question of whether the First Amendment
might prohibit disclosure upon a showing that disclosure could expose those
who signed a petition to serious harm.
Chief Justice Roberts, writing the opinion of the Court, accepted as given
that this case presented a First Amendment issue." He reasoned that signing a
petition in Washington's referendum process is a form of political expression
that necessarily implicates a First Amendment right." Rather than
distinguishing a petition for the purposes of a referendum procedure from
more traditional forms of speech, the Chief Justice relied on Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, a case considering the First Amendment rights of judicial
candidates to announce their views on disputed political and legal issues.34
There should be a key distinction between a law like the one challenged in
White, prohibiting candidates from expressing their political views, and the
one in Reed, mandating disclosure in the lawmaking process. Chief Justice
Roberts, however, did "not see how adding such legal effect to an expressive
activity somehow deprives that activity of its expressive component, taking it
outside the scope of the First Amendment."s Nonetheless, the Chief Justice
recognized that the challenged statute was not a prohibition on speech but
rather a disclosure requirement in the legislative process. He noted that the
Court will allow states flexibility in the implementation of voting systems. 6
Thus, the facial challenge in Reed failed, and the challenged law was upheld as
constitutional. The Court's decision, however, should have been unequivocal
in distinguishing lawmaking signatures from pure speech.
The opinion of the Court establishes a fact-bound approach that avoids
definitively resolving the dispute in Reed or giving lower courts clear guidance
32. Only Justice Stevens argued that the impact of disclosure on speech would be minimal. Id.
at 2829-30 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
33. Id. at 2817 (majority opinion).
34. Id. ("The State, having 'cho[sen] to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the
democratic process, . . . must accord the participants in that process the First Amendment
rights that attach to their roles."' (first alteration in original) (quoting Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002))). White involved a First Amendment challenge to
a Minnesota Supreme Court canon of judicial conduct that prohibited candidates for judicial
election from announcing their views on disputed political or legal issues. White, 536 U.S. at
768.
35. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2818.
36. Id. (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992)).
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on how to proceed in inevitable future cases." Rather than clearly
distinguishing pure speech from lawmaking activity, Chief Justice Roberts
affirmed the Ninth Circuit on the tenuous grounds that disclosure does not as
a general matter violate the First Amendment. Making explicit the Court's
decision to pass on the substantive controversy, Chief Justice Roberts wrote:
"We leave it to the lower courts to consider in the first instance the signers'
more focused claim concerning disclosure of the information on this particular
petition " This means that, on remand, the lower courts will have to
reconsider the as-applied challenge to the disclosure law. Worse still, in the
future there will be a case-by-case approach to determining when and if
legislative petition signers can claim anonymity with no settled standard of
review.
When lower courts seek to understand and apply Reed in the future they
will have to parse all seven opinions filed in the case. The variation between the
fractured opinions, even those concurring with the majority, is so significant
that lower courts will be able to pick and choose which approach to apply
rather than following any clear rule of law. The Justices in the majority
disagreed on a range of key issues including the proper legal standard, the
opinion's basic guiding principles, and, especially, the correct way to handle an
as-applied challenge. Justice Alito, for example, suggested that the as-applied
challenge should succeed in the lower courts as long as petitioners can
demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that disclosure will subject them to
threats or harassment." He suggested that the record easily meets that
standard and that lower courts should be generous in granting as-applied
relief.4 o Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand, set out a markedly different
standard for the as-applied challenge; her opinion was rooted in deference to
the states' efforts to regulate their lawmaking procedures." She concluded that
37. Only Justice Scalia (concurring in the judgment) and Justice Thomas (dissenting) relied on
reasoning that was not fact-bound. justice Scalia "doubt[ed]" that the disclosure statute is
subject to First Amendment analysis at all and argued that the states should have wide
latitude to determine their own legislative processes. Id. at 2832 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Thomas, on the other hand, was not persuaded that the state's interest in
disclosure was compelling and suggested that he would strike down the disclosure statute as
impermissibly burdening speech and as lacking any compelling government interest or
narrow tailoring. Id. at 2837 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 2815 (majority opinion).
39. Id. at 2822 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Bucldey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per
curiam)).
40. Id. at 2823-24.
41. Id. at 2827-29 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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lower courts "should be deeply skeptical" of efforts to conceal the identity of
those participating in the lawmaking process.
The decision in Reed fails to resolve definitively the legal question at the
heart of the case and creates a standard going forward that guarantees
confusion in the lower courts and in the direct democracy processes across the
country. The requisite case-by-case analysis of whether people signing
lawmaking petitions benefit from anonymity or are subject to public disclosure
must be made early enough in the process so that those being asked to sign
know what protection, if any, they will receive. However, courts may have no
real basis for making a determination before the signatures have been
gathered-judges are not in the business of predicting harassment or the state's
ability to protect against it.43
This Part has shown that the decision in Reed is at once too broad and too
narrow. It is too broad because it fails to establish a clear rule of law and thus
leaves the real decisionmaking to the lower courts. It is too narrow because it is
confined to First Amendment reasoning and balancing. The Court should have
established a judicially manageable standard that would guide lower courts
across the country to consistent outcomes in future litigation. Going forward, a
clear distinction should be made between pure speech and lawmaking. While
the Court upheld the disclosure statute, the argument for disclosure here is far
clearer in its application and has a solid grounding in history, doctrine, and
prudential considerations.
II. THE HISTORY OF ANONYMOUS SPEECH
Speech is, and has long been, intricately tied to the popular sovereignty
underpinnings of our constitutional government.' The United States has a
rich and complex history of both anonymous speech and compelled disclosure.
These historic practices have often coexisted in ways that suggest that they
need not be in tension. The history alone cannot be expected to provide
definitive answers, but it adds texture to our understanding of the role of
42. Id. at 2829.
43. But cf Rick Pildes, The First Amendment, Direct Democracy, and the Risks of Technology:
Today's Court Decision in Doe v. Reed, BALKINIZATION (June 24, 2010, 11:09 AM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/201o/o6/first-amendment-direct-democracy-and.html ("The
Court then wisely leaves it to lower courts and future cases to decide whether, in any
particular context, there is just a high risk of retaliation, harassment and the like to override
the state's legitimate interest in disclosure in particular contexts.").
44. See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119, 1124-25 (1995)
(describing freedom of speech as part of political thought and process).
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signatures in a direct democracy initiative. This Part presents the historic
practices that help identify appropriate distinctions today.
The argument here is not for originalism. Nor does this Note suggest that
originalism is always a useful constitutional theory in the context of the First
Amendment." Indeed, First Amendment law is largely judge-made,** and
scholars tend to agree that originalism is unhelpful in most First Amendment
cases. 4  Nevertheless, one need not necessarily endorse a jurisprudence of
originalism to embrace a broadly based analysis of First Amendment issues.
Historic practice provides valuable support for this Note's argument simply by
illuminating the evolving understanding of issues that shaped doctrine and
civil society. Here the history suggests useful distinctions that might guide a
judicial decision through points of tension in the doctrine.
The history and practices of previous generations yield clues about the
nature of the speech sought to be protected by the First Amendment and reveal
that most "petitioning" in early America would have been the kind that
requires the courage of one's conviction. The very nature of local government
meant that people knew others and were known in their communities -
anonymity was rarely an option for active participants in civil society. Even
45. Even the Court's stalwart originalist Justices Scalia and Thomas have differed with regard to
the breadth of protection afforded to anonymous speech. Compare McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 359 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(finding that "'freedom of speech, or of the press,' as originally understood, protected
anonymous political leafletting"), with id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing "this
newly expanded right-to-speak-incognito").
46. See Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cit. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) ("[M]ost
doctrine is merely the judge-made superstructure that implements basic constitutional
principles.... Judges given stewardship of a constitutional provision-such as the first
amendment -whose core is known but whose outer reach and contours are ill-defined, face
the never-ending task of discerning the meaning of the provision from one case to the
next."); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 198
(1988); Richard Nagareda, Comment, The Appellate Jurisprudence offustice Antonin Scalia, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 705, 731 (1987).
47. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8-io (3d ed. 2010) (noting that
historical evidence regarding the intended meaning of the First Amendment is "ambiguous"
and "unclear"); Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 115, 124 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(suggesting that the First Amendment's meaning was more contested at the time of its
enactment than it is in modern America); Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex, Violence, and the First
Amendment, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 1857, 1863 n-38 (2007) (noting that original intent does not
control First Amendment doctrine); cf Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-35 (1971) (arguing that the original meaning of the
Constitution would strip all but nondangcrous, explicitly political speech of First
Amendment protection).
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though national debates might have taken place through pseudonymous
publications, the lawmaking process itself was to be open and transparent-
fitting in a country giving nascent meaning to the concept of popular
sovereignty.
This Part marshals historic practice to argue that signatures on a petition
with legislative implications should not be considered pure speech that benefits
from the full protection of the First Amendment. This Part also considers and
explains several counterexamples of anonymous or secretive lawmaking,
including the drafting of the Constitution and the early years of Senate
proceedings. Historic examples of anonymous speech, such as the Federalist
papers, rarely had direct legislative implications.
A. Anonymous and Pseudonymous Speech
A history of anonymous speech could run from the colonial era ' to the
present day. However, the point of this Note is not to argue for or against a
right to anonymous speech. Rather, the goal here is to argue for a narrower,
more precise understanding of what actually constitutes speech in the context
of petitions and direct democracy initiatives. To that end, a more limited
review of the history is in order. History is rife with examples of anonymous
speech and publishing on issues of public concern but short on examples of
anonymous speech in legislative practice.
Anonymous publications have profoundly shaped American history going
back to the colonial era.4 9 A series of essays about free speech and liberty
known pseudonymously as "Cato's Letters" appeared in 1720.o Other colonial-
era examples include a series of pamphlets criticizing Tory-minded English
ministers that were published in the London Political Advertiser and reprinted in
48. The national tradition of anonymous speech has roots that can be traced back to England.
For a history of anonymous speech and pamphlets in England, see Jennifer B. Wieland,
Note, Death of Publius: Toward a World Without Anonymous Speech, 17 J.L. & POL. 589, 591
(2001). See also Note, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the
Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1084-86 (1961) [hereinafter Disclosure and the Devil] (arguing that
governmental efforts to repress anonymous speech notwithstanding, England was home to
a vibrant culture of anonymous or pseudonymous political discourse).
49. See Jonathan Turley, Registering Publius: The Supreme Court and the Right to Anonymity,
2001-2002 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 57, 59-60 (2002).
50. 1-2 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO's LETTERS: OR, ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL
AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS (Ronald Hamowy ed., Liberty Fund
1995) (6th ed. 1755).
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colonial newspapers under the pseudonym "Junius."" The famous pamphlet
Common Sense, widely recognized for its impact on the nascent independence
movement, was originally published under the simple pseudonym "An
Englishman."s2 The Supreme Court has recognized that anonymous forms of
speech "have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets
of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest."s While
these examples do not establish the prevalence or frequency of anonymous
speech in the colonial era, they indicate its existence, acceptance, and political
significance. Crucially, however, these colonial-era anonymous pamphlets and
writings were not used as part of any legislative process but rather as pure
speech on issues of public concern.
After independence, anonymous speech continued to play a major role in
the development of national politics, yet it still did not arise in the context of
legislation. Many of the Framers chose to participate anonymouslyS4 in the
debates surrounding ratification of the Constitution. The Federalist papers -
now known to have been authored by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and
James Madison-were all signed with the same pseudonym: Publius." Justice
Thomas recounts the history: "There is little doubt that the Framers engaged
in anonymous political writing. The essays in the Federalist Papers, published
under the pseudonym of 'Publius,' are only the most famous example of the
51. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 220 (John Mack
Faragher ed., 1996).
52. See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in THOMAS PAINE: COMMON SENSE
AND OTHER WRITINGS 5 (Gordon S. Wood ed., 2003); see also 1 GEORGE OTTO TREVELYAN,
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION pt. 2, at 150-54 (1903) (describing the influence of the pamphlet
in colonial America); Steve D. Shadowen, Sozi P. Tulante & Shara L. Alpern, No Distinctions
Except Those Which Merit Originates: The Unlawfulness of Legacy Preferences in Public and
Private Universities, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 51, 65 (2009) (characterizing Paine's pamphlet
as "enormously influential").
S3. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). Nevertheless, the Court tends to decide
disclosure cases based on more general First Amendment grounds rather than on an explicit
recognition of a right to anonymous speech. See, e.g., id.; infra Part III.
54. Note that anonymous participation need not preclude the opposite -namely, that
individuals may have chosen to communicate only some of their ideas anonymously.
Concurrent disclosure of identity for some communications and anonymity for others is
entirely plausible. For example, James Madison anonymously authored some of the
Federalist papers even as he personally and publicly spoke out in support of ratification. See,
e.g., THE COMPLETE MADISON: His BASIC WRITINGS (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) (including
material to which Madison attached his name at the time of publication).
55. See Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1817, 1853-54 (2010). Drawing on the history of the Federalist papers, Justice Black
defended anonymous speech and recognized "that anonymity has sometimes been assumed
for the most constructive purposes" in Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
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outpouring of anonymous political writing that occurred during the ratification
of the Constitution. In fact, Justice Thomas suggests that pseudonymous or
anonymous publication was "universal."" Certainly some opponents of
ratification also engaged in pseudonymous debate under names including
"Cato," "Centinel," "Brutus," "Federal Farmer," and "The Impartial
Examiner."'8 Yet, tellingly, none of these anonymous publications that make
up much of the historical record on the ratification debates were part of the
actual ratification process.
The distinction between the debates and the ratification process is
significant. While some of the national and local debate leading up to the state
conventions was anonymous, the identities of the representatives at the
conventions were public knowledge." The legislative process for ratification
was determined by each sovereign state, in compliance with Article VII of the
Constitution 6o but in no state was the ratification process anonymous or
secretive.6' Thus, to the extent that the anonymity of the Federalist papers and
the broader ratification history are relevant today, they seem to suggest an
acceptance of anonymous speech but not of anonymous legislative processes.
Anonymous speech and publishing were prevalent in post-ratification
America but were still confined to pure speech contexts and notably absent
from lawmaking.6 2 For example, Hamilton wrote a defense of George
56. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment). Justice Thomas's concurring opinion provides an exhaustive history of
anonymous speech, pseudonymous speech, and publishing in early American history. Id. at
361-69; see also id. at 341 & n.4 (majority opinion) (stating that "[g]reat works of literature
have frequently been produced by authors writing under assumed names" and listing
examples such as Mark Twain, Voltaire, George Eliot, Charles Lamb, and Charles Dickens).
57. Id. at 367 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
58. Id. at 368; see also id. ("The practice of publishing one's thoughts anonymously or under
pseudonym was so widespread that only two major Federalist or Anti-Federalist pieces
appear to have been signed by their true authors, and they may have had special reasons to
do so.")
59. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERJCA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 14-15, 308-12 (2005)
(discussing the ratification process, state conventions, and Article VII of the Constitution
and describing "elected statewide conventions").
6o. U.S. CONST. art. VII ("The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient
for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.").
61. See generally AMAR, supra note 59, at 6-7 (discussing the ratification process and
conventions).
62. See, e.g., DOUGLASS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 386 (Trevor Colbourn ed.,
Liberty Fund 1998) (1974) ("Almost all books, pamphlets, squibs, letters to the editor on
controversial issues-which naturally meant most political issues-were either unsigned or
signed with a pen name.").
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Washington's proclamation of neutrality in the war between Britain and
France under the pseudonym "Pacificus," and Madison responded under the
name "Helvidius."6 3 Indeed, well after the First Amendment was ratified,
anonymous political speech continued to serve as a popular means of political
expression on issues of public concern, even by those in power. Between 1789
and 1809, six presidents, fifteen cabinet members, twenty senators, and thirty-
four congressmen published anonymous or pseudonymous political writings.*
Even Chief Justice Marshall wrote anonymously as "A Friend of the Union" to
defend Supreme Court decisions against similarly anonymous attacks.6  But
this anonymous writing and publishing was not part of any legislative process.
Rather, these public figures and lawmakers chose to participate in national
debates and to influence popular opinion on issues of the day so as to foment
political support for the lawmaking work they publicly and transparently
engaged in under their true names. Nevertheless, the prevalence and
prominence of pseudonymous and anonymous speech raise the question of
why these individuals chose to publish anonymously.
While each individual author or speaker may well have personal reasons for
using the veil of anonymity, there are some common explanations for the use
of anonymous speech, none of which is applicable in the lawmaking context.
Generally, the justifications for anonymous speech can be divided into two
broad categories: "retaliation" and "source bias."6 6 First, pseudonyms or
outright anonymous speech may allow individuals to protect themselves from
economic, political, or even physical retaliation when speaking out on
controversial or unpopular issues. Pseudonyms would have been all the more
useful in an era where the code duello- the set of rules regulating dueling -
remained prevalent.6 ' These are certainly plausible, if partial, explanations for
why some colonial-era revolutionaries might have preferred not to have their
words attributed to their names. It seems implausible, however, to suggest that
63. See Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, GAZETTE U.S. (Phila.), June 29, 1793, reprinted in 15
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1969);
James Madison, Helvidius Number 1, GAZETTE U.S. (Phila.), Aug. 24, 1793, reprinted in 15
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 66 (Thomas A. Mason, Robert A. Rutland & Jeanne K.
Sisson eds., 1985).
64. See Disclosure and the Devil, supra note 48, at 1o85.
65. See 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 318 (photo. reprint 1980) (1919).
66. See Cardillo, supra note 30, at 1951-55. There may also have been class-based reasons for the
common use of pseudonyms. Adair suggests that "[a] gentleman lost caste if he wrote
professionally in competition with mere scribblers; and conversely, a lower-class
professional writer concealed behind a nom de plume could gain authority by writing as if
he were a gentleman." ADAIR, supra note 62, at 386 n.i.
67. See ADAIR, supra note 62, at 386 na.
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the elected and appointed officials engaged in lawmaking as part of their civic
duty would have sought a veil of anonymity for their public work.
Second, anonymous or pseudonymous speech can avoid source bias. Ideas
can speak for themselves without biasing the reader by identifying the author.
For example, if a person is unpopular, publishing anonymously or under a
nom de plume helps to ensure that the ideas are evaluated on their own merits
rather than tainted with the author's or speaker's unpopularity. Again,
however, this rationale is limited to pure speech and would be inapplicable to
the lawmaking process, in which legislatures and public officials generally want
credit for the work that they do and constituencies generally demand
accountability. Thus the history of anonymous speech and even the likely
motivation for anonymous speech do not tend to support a right to anonymous
lawmaking.68
68. Lest the history presented appear overwhelmingly one-sided, it is worth mentioning briefly
the parallel history of legal efforts to compel disclosure in the context of speech. The Post
Office Appropriation Act of 1912 required users of second-class mailing privileges
periodically to file and publish the names of their officers and proprietors. Post Office
Appropriation Act of 1912, ch. 389, § 2, 37 Stat. 553 (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 3685
(2006)); see also Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913) (construing and validating
the statute). And some states have tried to compel organizations to disclose the names of
their members. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 5s6 (1960) (challenging
municipal ordinances requiring disclosure of membership lists); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (overruling an order requiring the NAACP to produce
membership records, including names and addresses); New York ex rel. Bryant v.
Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) (upholding a state statute requiring certain associations to
file membership lists); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, i8i F. Supp. 37 (E.D. La.
1960) (invalidating a statute requiring disclosure of an organization's membership lists),
ayd, 366 U.S. 293 (1961). Other organizations have been required to register prior to
obtaining licenses to use public spaces for speech and association. See, e.g., Poulos v. New
Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (upholding a statute requiring an application for a license
prior to conducting open-air meetings); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)
(affirming a conviction for parading on a public street without a required license). In the
buildup to World War II Congress enacted statutes compelling disclosure by foreign agents.
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (20o6)). Although the Supreme Court limited the application of the
disclosure requirements, in dissent Justice Black relied on the House and Senate committee
reports to urge that the law be interpreted so as "to turn 'the spotlight of pitiless publicity'
upon the propaganda activities" in question. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 250
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B. Historical Practice: Public Politics and Disclosure
Many forms of political expression and lawmaking that existed during the
Founding era required disclosure by their very nature. Participating in "a
democracy takes a certain amount of civic courage,"69 and American history is
rife with examples of the kind of disclosure necessary to give legitimacy and
meaning to a political or legislative act. First and foremost, the Declaration of
Independence was signed with real names, not published as an anonymous
document or under pseudonyms.7 o In fact, it is virtually unthinkable that such
a document would have been left unsigned because it was the signatures that
gave it meaning -America's leading men were putting their names, their
reputations, and their lives on the line. Had they been afraid or otherwise
unwilling to sign their names - some oversized like John Hancock -why would
the King of England have taken their declaration seriously? Democratic values
encourage people to stand behind their beliefs even in the face of criticism or
backlash.
The U.S. Constitution, the pinnacle of American lawmaking, was drafted
by fifty-five men who were known to their states and the country.71 These
public figures finalized the Constitution with an act of public disclosure.
Thirty-nine of the fifty-five proudly signed at the bottom.72 Their names lent
the document legitimacy. Their status as delegates from the various states73
gave them some authority to act in a legislative capacity. That authority could
not have been exercised anonymously even if those same men subsequently
69. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. o9-559).
70. The parchment copy of the Declaration of Independence now on display at the National
Archives contains all of the original signatures. See CARL LOTUS BECKER, THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS 192-93 (photo. reprint
1956) (1942).
71. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 59, at 207-08 (describing the prominent, public roles several of
the signers of the Constitution played in colonial and early republican life); Edward C.
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of
the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 30
(1994) ("More than half of the fifty-five delegates had training in the law. Eight of them had
signed the Declaration of Independence and two the Articles of Confederation. Some forty
had served in the Congress under the Confederation and seven in the First Continental
Congress. A number had been involved in the formation of their state constitutions, and
seven had served as the chief executives of their states. Indeed, at the time of the convention,
more than forty delegates were involved with their state government either as chief
executive, judge, or legislator." (citations omitted)).
72. See AMAR, supra note 59, at 80; MAx FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 38-39 (1913).
73. Only Rhode Island boycotted the Convention. See AMAR, supra note 59, at 5.
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chose to promote the ratification through anonymous publications. These two
historic examples suggest a crucial distinction. Anonymous speech-even
political speech in support of or opposition to specific laws or procedures -
should be viewed as distinct from anonymous lawmaking.
A counterpoint, however, is the fact that the Constitutional Convention
itself was "shrouded in secrecy."74 Just days after the Framers convened in
Philadelphia in May 1787, they adopted a rule of secrecy that lasted for the
duration of the Convention.75 Explanations for why, under the unique
circumstances of the Convention, the Framers decided to proceed in secret can
be found in the historical record. For example, in May 1787, George Mason
penned a letter to his son indicating that he supported the secrecy as "a proper
precaution to prevent mistakes and misrepresentation until the business shall
have been completed, when the whole may have a very different complexion
from that in which the several crude and indigested parts might in their first
shape appear if submitted to the public eye."" Other contemporary letters
from the Framers similarly indicate a desire to explain or excuse the need for
secrecy.77
Thus, the secrecy of the proceedings was seen, then and now, as a distinct
aberration from the norm of transparency. Moreover, the secrecy rule may not
have been effective at keeping the proceedings quiet, even during the
Convention. 5 And, crucially, by 1819 the government had published the full
Convention proceedings as the official journal of the Convention79 pursuant to
an act of Congress.o Today, most leading constitutional law scholars rightly
74. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret
Drafting History, 91 GEo. L.J. 1113, 1115 (2003).
75. See I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 15 & n.2 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966) (rev. ed. 1937).
76. Letter from George Mason to George Mason, Jr. (May 27, 1787), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 75, at 28.
77. See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Martin to Governor Caswell (July 27, 1787), in 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 75, at 64 (explaining why Martin
had been "remiss in making ... Communications from the Federal Convention").
78. See, e.g., JOHN K. ALEXANDER, THE SELLING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: A
HISTORY OF NEWS COVERAGE 137 (1990) (suggesting that the proceedings of the Convention
were not fully secret because of leaks).
79. JOURNAL, ACTS, AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED AT PHILADELPHIA,
MONDAY, MAY 14, AND DISSOLVED MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1787, WHICH FORMED THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Boston, Thomas B. Wait 1819), available at
http://ia7 o04o8.us.archive.org/12/items/journalactsproce1819unit/journalactsprocel819unit
.pdf.
8o. Act of Mar. 27, 1818, 3 Stat. 475.
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recognize that little weight should be given to the secret proceedings.
Consistent with the theories and practice of popular sovereignty at the core of
this country's political system, the secret drafting history is worth far less than
the public ratification process.
Numerous overt acts involved in the lawmaking process are today, or were
historically, public. Even those political or legislative acts that are not
inherently public were often made public by the various states in which they
occurred. For example, during much of U.S. history voting was a public
affair." In colonial New England, for instance, voting was initially conducted
by a public showing of hands."' The colonies soon switched to paper ballots
but with no pretense of secrecy as a motivation. Rather, having a paper trail
made more sense procedurally84 -just as disclosure does in the context of direct
democracy today. Not until 1888 did Massachusetts become the first state to
begin using the "Australian ballot" system for secret voting."' While almost all
jurisdictions now employ a secret ballot system, at least one state allows voters
to cast their ballots openly, if they so choose." In modern America, party
81. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1059 n.8o (1984) ("[C]onstitutional interpreters should place very little weight on the
secret notes that Madison compiled during the Constitutional Convention . . . ."); Akhil
Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 288 (1987)
(arguing that Madison's notes should be seen as "accurate but indirect evidence" of the way
that leaders of the day understood the text of the Constitution); Martin S. Flaherty, The
Most Dangerous Branch, 1oS YALE L.J. 1725, 1802 (1996) ("[T]he great public discussion over
the document, which involved hundreds of writers for more than a year, can clarify
meanings that the private drafting of the instrument, which involved fifty-five speakers
during a single summer, cannot.").
82. Until the 189os, secret voting, or the "Australian ballot," was not available under most state
electoral proceedings. See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1327
(2000); Jac. C. Heckelman, The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter Turnout Rates, 82 PUB.
CH-OICE 107, 111 (1995). See generally ELDON COBB EVANS, A HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN
BALLOT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1917) (describing the introduction of secret voting
to the United States).
83. See 3 CORTLANDT F. BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 141 (photo.
reprint 2002)(New York, Columbia Coll. 1893).
84. See THE COLONIAL LAws OF MASSACHUSETTS: REPRINTED FROM THE EDITION OF 166o, WITH
THE SUPPLEMENTS TO 1672, at 149 (photo. reprint) (Boston, Rockwell & Churchill 1889)
(indicating that elections would proceed "by writing the names of the person Elected, in
papers open, or once foulded, not twisted nor rouled up, that they may be the sooner
perused").
85. See EVANS, supra note 82, at 19.
86. See W. VA. CONST. art. W, 5 2 ("In all elections by the people, the mode of voting shall be by
ballot; but the voter shall be left free to vote by either open, sealed or secret ballot, as he may
elect.").
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primaries in states that use a caucus system, like Iowa, are incompatible with
anonymity: an eligible voter who wants to participate in that particular
electoral process has to be willing to reveal his or her identity."' Historically,
and today, each state has broad discretion to determine its own electoral
procedures, even if participation requires disclosure of identity."
Public town hall meetings, which have seen resurgence in recent years,9
were hallmarks of early American politics, especially in New England.90 After
experiencing New England town hall meetings firsthand, Thomas Jefferson
advocated their adoption across the country in 1816.9' Alexis de Tocqueville's
extensive travels in early republican America led him to observe that "local
assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. Municipal
institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it
within the people's reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it.""
While today's town hall meetings tend not to play any explicit lawmaking role,
such was not always the case. Historically, these meetings often served as
municipal legislative bodies, a role that Timothy Dwight, former president of
Yale University, vigorously defended.93 Dwight suggested that the discussions
at the meetings were public events and that "[a]ll the proceedings of these
assemblies are also matters of record."94 At least one New England court has
recognized the central role that public town hall meetings played, declaring
87. See generally Joanna Klonsky, The Caucus System in the U.S. Presidential Nominating Process,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/publication/i564o/
caucus-system in-the-us-presidential nominating process.html#p2 (describing the
caucus process).
88. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof
.... "); Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary: The Crucial Role of State
Election Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to Democracy, 27 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REV. 343, 354-57 (2008); Note, Toward a Greater State Role in Election Administration, 118
HARv. L. REV. 2314, 2316 (2005).
89. See, e.g., Carolyn J. Lukensmeyer & Steve Brigham, Taking Democracy to Scale: Creating a
Town Hall Meeting for the Twenty-First Century, 91 NAT'L CIVIC REV. 351 (2002) (advocating a
new model of town hall meetings as a way to give voice to the public and gather information
for elected officials).
go. See FRANK M. BRYAN, REAL DEMOCRACY: THE NEw ENGLAND TOWN HALL MEETING AND
How IT WORKS 26-27 (2004).
91. See id. at 26 n.3.
92. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE: DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 53 (Isaac Kramnick ed., W.W. Norton &
Co. 2007) (Henry Reeve trans. 1841).
93. See 1 TIMOTHY DWIGHT, TRAVELS IN NEW ENGLAND AND NEw YORK 179-82 (Barbara Miller
Solomon ed., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1969) (1821).
94. Id. at 179.
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that "[i]t is hard to overestimate the historic significance and patriotic
influence of the public meetings held in all the towns of Massachusetts before
and during the Revolution."" These meetings -whether explicitly legislative
in function or not-required disclosure as a prerequisite to participation in the
political process. While the history need not control the present, it bolsters the
position of those states that establish lawmaking procedures involving
disclosure.
Another crucial example of historic disclosure practice in lawmaking comes
from the Constitution and the congressional record. Congressional votes were
to be tallied by name and entered in the public congressional journal "at the
Desire of one fifth of those Present.", 6 This allowed each state or district to
hold its elected officials accountable, but it is also noteworthy as the lowest
fraction to appear anywhere in the Constitution." Accountability for legislative
action was a valued norm. This norm may have developed in tandem with
republican theory, which served "to reverse the old presumption in favor of
secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a
presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular
9s. Wheelock v. City of Lowell, 81 N.E. 977, 979 (Mass. 1907). The quote continues:
No small part of the capacity for honest and efficient local government manifested
by the people of this commonwealth has been due to the training of citizens in the
forum of the town meeting. The jealous care to preserve the means for exercising
the right of assembling for discussion of public topics manifested in city charters
by the representatives of the people, whenever providing for the transition from
the town meeting to the city form of local government, demonstrates that a vital
appreciation of the importance of the opportunity to exercise the right still
survives. The practical instruction of the citizen in affairs of government through
the instrumentality of public meetings and face to face discussions may be
regarded quite as important as their amusement, edification or assumed temporal
advancement in ways heretofore expressly authorized by statute and held
constitutional.
Id. (citations omitted).
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. Of course publication of the voting record might have been
made mandatory in all circumstances; however, an earlier part of the Clause hints at an
explanation for why disclosure was originally made optional: "excepting such Parts as may
in their Judgment require Secrecy." Id. Note that any form of disclosure marked a change
from historical practice in England and the colonies that had shielded Parliament from
public scrutiny. See AMAR, supra note 59, at 82.
97. Cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (using two-thirds for an impeachment conviction); id. art. I,
§ 5, cl. 2 (using two-thirds in order to expel a member of Congress); id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2
(using two-thirds to bypass a presidential veto); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (using two-thirds for
purposes of Senate advice and consent to the President); id. art. V (using two-thirds and
three-fourths for purposes of amending the Constitution).
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sovereignty.",8 The House opened its doors to the public from the start, and
the Senate followed by the mid-1790s." Similarly, individual states have a long
history of opening the doors of their legislatures to "the admission of all
persons." 00 Procedures, forums, and venues like these shaped early America
even as they required source disclosure in lawmaking. The very nature of these
activities precluded true anonymity, and with good reason: transparency was
necessary in the lawmaking process if the people were to hold their lawmakers
or representatives accountable.
Today lawmaking and government processes are transparent in ways the
Founders never could have imagined. For example, the Cable-Satellite Public
Affairs Network (C-SPAN) airs constant coverage of government proceedings
and public affairs programming."o' C-SPAN now operates a radio station and
three full-time cable channels covering the House, the Senate, and a wide array
of other government and public affairs activities.0 2 C-SPAN strives for
independence and does not accept outside advertising or government
funding.0 3 For its part, the Obama White House has pledged that it "is
committed to creating an unprecedented level of openness in Government."10 4
98. DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS 13 (1981).
99. See id. at 24-29, 48-49, 55-61.
loo. PA. CONST. Of 1776, art. II, § 13; see also N.Y. CONST. art. III, § lo ("Each house of the
legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and publish the same, except such parts as
may require secrecy. The doors of each house shall be kept open, except when the public
welfare shall require secrecy."). More recently, states have begun passing "sunshine" laws to
increase open access to government documents and proceedings. See generally Michael K.
McLendon & James C. Hearn, Mandated Openness in Public Higher Education: A Field Study of
State Sunshine Laws and Institutional Governance, 77 J. HIGHER EDUC. 645, 645-46 (20o6)
(describing the proliferation of sunshine laws).
101. C-SPAN, http://www.c-span.org (follow "Schedules" tab to subsequent options) (last
visited Feb. 23, 2011).
102. Id.
103. See generally About C-SPAN, C-SPAN, http://www.c-span.org/About/About-C-SPAN (last
visited Feb. 23, 2011) ("C-SPAN receives no government funding; operations are funded by
fees paid by cable and satellite affiliates who carry C-SPAN programming.").
104. Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 2009 DAILY COMP. PREs. Doc.
(Jan. 21, 2009). In practice the Obama Administration's efforts toward increased
transparency have received mixed reviews. See, e.g., THE NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE, GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIV., SUNSHINE AND SHADOWS: THE CLEAR OBAMA MESSAGE FOR FREEDOM




PUBLIUS AND THE PETITION
Even some courts are opening up and, in some cases, allowing live feed
broadcasting of courtroom proceedings. o0
A counterargument here might point to the closed-door congressional
proceedings during the early years of the American Republic until 1794."o
Jared Sparks explained that aberration, however, by conceptualizing the early
Congress as a joint legislative-executive body that required more discretion and
secrecy than would a pure legislative body.o 7 The early Senate rules, for
example, reflect the belief that the body's "special roles, including providing
advice and consent to the executive branch," necessitated a shroud of
secrecy.os Today these closed-door sessions are generally limited to specific
subject areas like impeachment proceedings and national security.o 9 While it is
true that any member of Congress can request a secret session, in practice there
is a strong bias in favor of transparency in proceedings. Indeed, from 1929 to
2004 there were only fifty-three secret Senate sessions, several of which related
to the impeachment of President Clinton.no Meanwhile, from 1812 until 2004
the House held just five closed sessions, all of which related to high-level
executive issues or national security concerns."
The distinction between pure speech, including anonymous publications
like the Federalist papers, and lawmaking is clear from the historic record; the
two categories should not be blurred in modern America. This Part has traced
key events and activities in American history from the colonial period to the
present day to support the argument for a distinction between pure, protected
105. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
To Offer Remote Viewing of En Banc Proceedings (Dec. 13, 201o), available at
http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/absolutenn/articlefiles/279-COADecemberEnBancs.pdf.
But see Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705 (2010) (staying an order to broadcast
courtroom proceedings in California's controversial Proposition 8 case).
106. See MILDRED AMER, SECRET SESSIONS OF CONGRESS: A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW (2004).
107. Journal Entry by Jared Sparks (Apr. 19, 1830), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 75, at 478, 478-79.
lo8. AMER, supra note io6, at 2.
iog. See id. at 1.
110. See id. at 3.
ill. See id. at 6. Moreover, even in the early years when secret sessions were the norm,
congressional proceedings were necessarily deliberations limited to a small group of elected
representatives. Direct democracy initiatives, on the other hand, are inherently public, all-
inclusive affairs. It might be possible to conduct secretive legislative activity in Congress in
the interests of national security or cooperation with the executive branch, but it might not
be with a ballot initiative in which all voters should be fully informed and have access to the
same information and in which the state's interest in preventing fraud or manipulation is
compelling.
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speech and lawmaking activity. The long, proud history of anonymous speech
is largely relegated to what can easily be recognized as pure speech. Lawmaking
and legislative processes have tended towards transparency and public
disclosure, as would be expected in a country founded on principles of popular
sovereignty. While historic practice alone is not controlling, this background
finds further support from Supreme Court doctrine and prudential
considerations.
III.ANONYMOUS SPEECH AND DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
The modern right to anonymous speech is in tension with a parallel
doctrine of disclosure."' This Part examines each of these doctrines in turn. It
shows that much of what is commonly described as anonymous speech
doctrine is more precisely concerned with issues such as associational rights
and rooting out illegitimate government purposes."' The doctrine that directly
or indirectly protects anonymous speech should not be construed to extend to
lawmaking processes such as direct democracy initiatives. Disclosure doctrine,
however, which has developed largely in the context of elections and
lawmaking, should apply. This Part reviews each doctrine in turn, highlighting
the points of tension and intersection in order to demonstrate the crucial
distinction between pure speech and lawmaking or legislative activity.
A. Anonymous Speech Doctrine: Talley and McIntyre
In early years," 4 the Court did not explicitly recognize a right to
anonymous speech but instead struck down disclosure requirements,
112. For a broader overview of historical First Amendment doctrine than is useful here, see David
M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205
(1983); and David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514
(1981).
113. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) ("[T]he application of First
Amendment law is best understood and most readily explained as a kind of motive-
hunting."); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001)
(arguing for "purposivism" in First Amendment analysis of challenged laws and
regulations).
114. Before wading into the analysis of First Amendment doctrine, a disclaimer is in order. The
bulk of First Amendment cases that have reached the Supreme Court over the last 150 years
are actually Fourteenth Amendment cases insofar as incorporation is what enables
enforcement of the First Amendment against the states. Moreover, just as the struggles on
behalf of racial equality and democratic inclusion are what led to the ratification of the
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indicating an awareness that such requirements could threaten free speech. For
example, in Thomas v. Collins the Court struck down a Texas statute requiring
a union official to register with the Texas Secretary of State prior to soliciting
members."' Similarly, in Lovell v. City of Griffin the Court struck down a
municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution of handbills, petitions, or
literature of any kind without a permit as a per se invalid infringement of First
Amendment rights."' These cases serve as examples of early anonymous
speech doctrine that define the jurisprudential terrain today."'
Anonymous speech doctrinal analysis often begins in 1958 with NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson."' in the midst of the civil rights movement, the
NAACP challenged an Alabama statute requiring the organization to reveal the
names and addresses of all its members. While ruling unanimously in favor of
the NAACP, the Court avoided any explicit recognition of a right to
anonymous speech in favor of an alternative, more general constitutional
theory."' The Court noted "the vital relationship between freedom to associate
and privacy in one's associations.""'o Hence, context was key to the outcome in
Patterson.
Fourteenth Amendment, many of the cases interpreting the First Amendment's application
to the states came out of the civil rights movement in the South, another generation's
struggle for inclusion. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 66-
70 (1966). Thus, the First Amendment doctrine and analysis that follows makes sense only
because of the historic processes of expanding democratic inclusion in general and the
Fourteenth Amendment in particular; it is a deeply American story inextricably connected to
historic struggles for expansion of democratic rights, popular sovereignty, and broader
inclusion in civil society.
us. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
116. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
117. See also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (limiting First Amendment
protections against compulsory disclosure of associational relationships in the context of a
governmental interest of inquiry into the Communist Party); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957) (overturning a conviction for refusal to identify members of a fringe
political party); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (protecting a witness from a
congressional committee's efforts to compel disclosure); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S.
41 (1953) (restricting the reach of a House resolution seeking to require disclosure of the
names of people who made bulk purchases of certain political books).
118- 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see, e.g., KALVEN, supra note 114, at 91; Meredith Hattendorf, Comment,
Theoretical Splits and Consistent Results on Anonymous Political Speech: Majors v. Abell and
ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 925, 930 (20o6); Wieland, supra note 48, at
594.
iig. The Court framed anonymity as a question related to "[e]ffective advocacy" and association
rather than its own independent right. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
120. Id. at 462.
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The NAACP and the threatened racial minority group that it represented
faced economic reprisal, public hostility, and threats of physical coercion.
Moreover, in Patterson the Court held that whether disclosure was justified
turned solely on the substantiality of the state's interest in obtaining the
sought-after information as balanced against the members' associational
rights. 12  There, the state's sole justification for its desire to obtain the
membership information was to facilitate its evaluation of whether the NAACP
was acting in violation of the state's foreign corporation registration statute.'
But, as the Court found, the sought-after membership information had
virtually no relationship to the state's purported interest."*
In the immediate aftermath of Patterson, the Court had the opportunity to
consider squarely the issue of anonymous speech. Talley v. California concerned
a Los Angeles ordinance requiring that any handbills distributed have printed
on their cover the names and addresses of the person or persons who authored,
printed, and distributed the handbills.' The Court was unequivocal in striking
down the ordinance: "There can be no doubt that [the challenged]
identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute
information and thereby freedom of expression."12 The decision reasoned that
the ordinance was an overbroad method of achieving the state's purported
interests of protecting against fraud, false advertising, and libel.' Again, the
state's purpose was key to the outcome. As in other cases, the history of
anonymous speech was used to buttress the importance of the outcome rather
than as evidence of a specific right being violated."" This landmark decision
121. The same is not true of most political groups today that have support sufficient to garner the
number of signatures required to initiate a ballot initiative. Though the petitioners in Reed
claimed that they feared reprisals, Petitioners' Brief at 10-12, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811
(2010) (No. 09-559), they are not a vulnerable minority group in any meaningful sense.
122. See KALVEN, supra note 114, at 92-94.
123. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 464.
124. See id.; see also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (196o) (extending protection from
compelled disclosure to NAACP contributors).
125. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
126. Id. at 64.
127. Id. at 63-65.
128. In dissent, Justice Clark attempted to distinguish Talley's situation from that of the NAACP
by indicating that "[t]he record is barren of any claim, much less proof, that he will suffer
any injury whatever by identifying the handbill with his name." Id. at 69 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). Justice Clark continued his strongly worded dissent: "I stand second to none in
supporting Talley's right of free speech-but not his freedom of anonymity." Id. at 70.
Justice Clark reported that, at the time, thirty-six states had laws prohibiting anonymous
campaign literature. Id. at 70 n.2.
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was the first recognition in the Court's modern jurisprudence of anything like a
constitutional right to anonymous political speech. It would be another thirty-
five years before the Court would flesh out the boundaries of anonymous
speech. 19
In the 1995 case McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Court was tasked
with substantively exploring the nature of and limits to any right to
anonymous political speech."o McIntyre brought a First Amendment"'
challenge to an Ohio statute that required any written communication intended
"to influence the voters in any election" to contain the name and address of
anyone involved in funding or producing the communication."' This case
squarely presented a challenge to the state's ability to limit anonymous speech
in a context much narrower than that in Talley: elections. It was on that
ground that the Ohio Supreme Court had distinguished this case from Talley
and upheld the statute."'
The Supreme Court reversed the Ohio court, holding that the First
Amendment protected McIntyre's right to anonymous political speech
notwithstanding the state's legitimate interest in preventing fraud and libel. 4
Following the Talley Court's example, the majority in McIntyre recounted a
history of anonymous, protected speech, and emphasized the chilling effect of
compelled disclosure."' According to the decision, "[T]he interest in having
anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs
any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry."g 6 While
this decision went further than Talley in clarifying anonymous speech doctrine,
129. For more on associational speech rights in the context of the NAACP's work in the South,
see KALVEN, supra note 114, at 65-121.
130. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). The case attracted considerable attention. See, e.g., Rachel J. Grabow,
Note, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: Protecting the Freedom of Speech or Damaging
the Electoral Process?, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 565 (1997) (examining the right to distribute
anonymous campaign literature); Julia L. Luongo, Case Note, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995), 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1277 (1996) (reviewing the facts and
outcome of the case); Mark A. Whitt, Note, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n: "A Whole
New Boutique of Wonderful First Amendment Litigation Opens Its Doors," 29 AKRON L. REV. 423
(1996) (criticizing the holding for misapplying early American history, wrongly applying
strict scrutiny, and failing to recognize that the policy was narrowly tailored).
131. The challenge was actually based on the First Amendment as incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 336 n.i.
132. Id. at 338 n.3.
133. See id. at 339-40.
134. Id. at 348-51, 357.
135. Id. at 341-56.
136. Id. at 342.
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it too balanced a public interest against a private right without providing much
clarity regarding the contours of that balance.
The Court's opinion in McIntyre was vague in ways that ensured future
litigation over the regulation of anonymous speech. 7 Justice Scalia expressed
concern that it could "take decades to work out the shape of this newly
expanded right-to-speak-incognito."' Indeed, states were left to guess at the
boundaries of the right to anonymous speech.139 The confusion in this area of
law has extended to lower courts as well, including a circuit split on the
issue.4 o The confusion and litigation highlights the need for a clearer approach
to this area of law, such as that advocated in this Note.
Properly understood, anonymous speech doctrine does not extend to the
lawmaking process. In her scholarly writings as a professor, Justice Elena
Kagan argued that First Amendment case law is primarily concerned with
rooting out "improper governmental motives.""'4 If so, this highlights a crucial
137. In dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that, thanks to the majority opinion, "a whole new boutique
of wonderful First Amendment litigation opens its doors." Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., First Amendment and Restrictions on Political Speech: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, io6th Cong. 13-16 (1999) (statement of
David M. Mason, Comm'r, FEC) (discussing the risks and uncertainty of having disclosure
statutes overturned). For a discussion of the state legislative responses to McIntyre, see Amy
Constantine, Note, What's in a Name? McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: An
Examination of the Protection Afforded to Anonymous Political Speech, 29 CONN. L. REV. 459,
477-82 (1996).
140. In ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, the Ninth Circuit was presented with a First Amendment
challenge to a Nevada statute that required "persons either paying for or 'responsible for
paying for' the publication of 'any material or information relating to an election, candidate
or any question on a ballot' to identify their names and addresses on 'any [published]
printed or written matter or any photograph."' 378 F.3d 979, 981 ( 9th Cir. 2004) (alteration
in original) (quoting the Nevada statute). The Ninth Circuit found the statute to be
inconsistent with the First Amendment protections identified in McIntyre. Id. at 989-91. The
same year, the Seventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of similar legislation out of
Indiana but came to a different conclusion than the Ninth Circuit did in Heller. The
challenged statute required that an identifying disclaimer be placed on any political
advertising that expressly supported or opposed a particular candidate. Majors v. Abell, 361
F.3d 349, 350 (7th Cit. 2004). The Seventh Circuit dismissed the suit on the merits. Id. at
355. Judge Posner, writing for the majority, distinguished the case from McIntyre and instead
placed it in a line of Supreme Court cases based on disclosure in political campaigns. Id. at
351-52. As Judge Easterbrook's dubitante opinion in Majors highlights, however, the
anonymous speech doctrine epitomized by McIntyre is in tension with the disclosure
doctrine Judge Posner relied on to resolve the case. Id. at 355-56 (Easterbrook, J., dubitante);
see also Hattendorf, supra note 118 (discussing circuit court rulings on anonymous political
speech in the wake of McIntyre).
141. Kagan, supra note 113, at 414.
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distinction between anonymous speech cases and cases like Reed. In Reed, the
public interest in disclosure is the need for transparency in validating
signatures gathered to activate a legislative process. Where signatures are part
of a lawmaking process, the state's interest in disclosure is necessarily tied to its
obligation to protect the integrity of the referendum or initiative as well as the
broader political-electoral process. In cases like Patterson and McIntyre the
regulated activity in question was not itself a direct part of the legislative
process and was clearly association or speech activity-both key distinctions
from Reed and efforts to regulate direct democracy. Whether or not a right to
anonymous speech exists at all remains unclear, but if it does exist, nothing in
the case law suggests that it should extend to the direct democracy legislative
process. Instead, a parallel doctrine of disclosure should apply.
B. Disclosure Doctrine
A separate doctrine has developed in the context of campaign finance
regulation that is in tension with the anonymous speech doctrine and suggests
that disclosure requirements in direct democracy initiatives are acceptable.
These cases have upheld reporting and disclosure requirements in the context
of elections and lawmaking without clearly distinguishing the anonymous
speech cases. From Buckley v. Valeo," the first modern 43 case upholding
disclosure requirements, to the 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC,m' the
Court has recognized campaign contributions and expenditures as protected
political speech, even while upholding related disclosure laws. Thus, even if
142. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
143. There are earlier cases. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (upholding
disclosure requirements and regulation of lobbying activity); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395, 407 n.1 (1953) ("'[A] state may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by
requiring a stranger in the community .. . to establish his identity . . . ."' (quoting Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 3o6 (1940))); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)
(affirming a conviction for parading on a public street without a required license); New
York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 72 (1928) ("[The disclosure requirement
proceeds] on the two-fold theory that the state within whose territory and under whose
protection the association exists is entitled to be informed of its nature and purpose, of
whom it is composed and by whom its activities are conducted, and that requiring this
information to be supplied for the public files will operate as an effective or substantial
deterrent from the violations of public and private right to which the association might be
tempted if such a disclosure were not required."); Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S.
288, 296 (1913) (upholding a federal provision requiring "'every newspaper, magazine,
periodical, or other publication"' to submit a list of its editorial and business officers
(quoting Post Office Appropriation Act of 1912, ch. 389, § 2, 37 Stat. 553, 554)).
144. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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First Amendment rights are implicated by direct democracy disclosure laws,
the laws should generally withstand scrutiny.
Buckley presented a complex constitutional challenge to campaign finance
disclosure requirements.14s The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)
severely restricted campaign contributions and imposed strict disclosure and
reporting requirements.146 FECA required reporting and public disclosure of
contributions and expenditures above certain thresholds, including the donor's
name, address, and other personal information.147
In a lengthy per curiam decision, the Court struck down the limitations on
campaign expenditures, independent expenditures by individuals and groups,
and personal expenditures by candidates; the Court upheld, however, FECA's
contribution restrictions, as well as its disclosure and reporting provisions.' 4
Of particular relevance here are the disclosure and reporting requirements. The
politician challenging the statute contended that "the reporting and disclosure
provisions of the Act unconstitutionally impinge on [his] right to freedom of
association."' 4" But even those challenging the statute recognized that the
disclosure requirements were not "per se unconstitutional restrictions on the
exercise of First Amendment freedoms of speech and association."' Rejecting
arguments of overbreadth, the Buckley Court held that if the disclosure
requirements are narrowly construed, they are "within constitutional
bounds."'5 The Court then decided to apply strict scrutiny.
The government interests underlying FECA were threefold: first, to
provide the electorate with useful electoral information; second, to deter
corruption or the appearance of corruption; and third, to gather data necessary
to detect violations of other requirements and regulations.' Quoting Justice
Brandeis, the Court commented: "'Publicity is justly commended as a remedy
145. For an excellent summary of the Court's analysis of the expenditure and contribution limits,
see FARBER, supra note 47, at 234-37. See also Trevor Potter, Buckley v. Valeo, Political
Disclosure and the First Amendment, 33 AKRON L. REV. 71 (1999) (reviewing the disclosure
doctrine).
146. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (Supp. II 1973). FECA, the Court noted, was "'by far the most
comprehensive reform legislation [ever] passed by Congress concerning"' elections. Buckley,
424 U.S. at 7 (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 5i9 F.2d 821, 831 (D.C. Cir.
1975)).
147. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13, 63-64-
148. Id. at 14-34.
149. Id. at ii.
iso. Id. at 6o.
151. Id. at 6o-61.
152. Id. at 66-68.
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for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants
. . . ."' After careful analysis the Court concluded that "the substantial public
interest in disclosure . . . outweighs the harm generally alleged."' 4 Over time
the Court has recognized that providing information to the electorate is a
substantial state interest."ss But the application of the doctrine remains far from
clear because the valid state interest in disclosure must be balanced against any
potential infringement of freedom of speech.s 6 Thus, in First Amendment
cases in which a party challenging a disclosure requirement could show "a
reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors'
names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals," the Court would
be inclined to strike the requirement down as unconstitutional.17 The outcome
of the case established what then-Professor Kagan called "the Buckley
principle," which she defined "as an evidentiary tool designed to aid in the
search for improper motive, much like the presumption against content-based
restrictions."s" Several Justices suggested that the same logic should apply in
Reed,' 9 but the argument here is for a clearer, more definitive acceptance of
disclosure policies in the specific context of direct democracy legislation.
As lobbyists, campaigners, and politicians devised ways to get around
FECA restrictions, Congress updated that legislation. The Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002160 (BCRA) was designed "'to purge national
153. Id. at 67 (quoting LOUIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE
IT 62 (1933)).
154. Id. at 72.
155. See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978) (stating that "the people
in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the
relative merits of conflicting arguments" and thus there is a significant public interest in
ensuring free access to information).
156. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (20o8) (finding unconstitutional a disclosure
requirement imposed on a self-financed candidate); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of
N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166-67 (2002) (striking down a local ordinance
requiring door-to-door canvassers to obtain permits revealing their identities); Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1981) ("The integrity of
the political system will be adequately protected if contributors are identified in a public
filing revealing the amounts contributed; if it is thought wise, legislation can outlaw
anonymous contributions.").
157. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74. The Court had the opportunity to apply this exemption to a minor
party. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 92 (1982) ("The
government's interests in compelling disclosures are 'diminished' in the case of minor
parties.").
158. Kagan, supra note 113, at 467.
159. See supra Part I for a detailed analysis of the decision in Reed.
160. 2 U.S.C. 5 431 (2006).
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politics of what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of "big money"
campaign contributions.'1 6 , One of the provisions of the BCRA required
disclosure to the FEC by any person making large campaign disbursements.16 ,
In rejecting a constitutional challenge to this disclosure requirement of the
BCRA, 6 , the Court provided little guidance for lower courts.164 Just a few
years later the Court issued another major decision on BCRA.
In Citizens United v. FEC,165 the Court extended to corporations the same
First Amendment political speech protections enjoyed by individuals and
undermined the government's ability to implement controls on unlimited
corporate spending in elections.' 6 6 The Court, however, found that Congress
can require disclaimers and disclosure of spending. As Justice Kennedy put it,
"The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits
citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper
way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed
decisions. . . ."'17 Thus, even as anonymous speech doctrine and disclosure
doctrine have evolved, expanded, and contracted in tension with each other,
the Court has tended to reject facial First Amendment challenges to statutory
disclosure requirements when there is a legitimate government interest behind
a content-neutral regulation.
161. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003) (quoting United States v. Auto. Workers, 352
U.S. 567, 572 (1957)).
162. 2 U.S.C. § 441i.
163. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 142, 156, 161, 171.
164. As Judge Easterbrook critically pointed out in Majors, the Court's "failure to discuss
McIntyre, or even to cite Talley, American Constitutional Law Foundation, or Watchtower,
makes it impossible for courts at [the circuit] level to make an informed decision" about
which principle to apply in disclosure cases. Majors v. Abell, 361 F-3d 349, 356 (7th Cir.
2004) (Easterbrook, J., dubitante).
165. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). Years after publishing her article Private Speech, Public Purpose, cited
supra note 113, then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan argued the government's case in Citizens
United. Kagan lost the case, but the outcome may be consistent with her academic
scholarship insofar as both her article and the Citizens United majority sought to distinguish
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), from Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976). See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (citing Austin throughout); Kagan, supra
note 113, at 465 n.143.
166. This aspect of Citizens United has been the focus of reporting and commentary on the case.
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Campaign Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2010, at Ai; see also Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and
Disclaimer for Corporate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622
(2010) (arguing that broad disclosure and disclaimer regulations for corporate electoral
speech are both constitutionally sound and normatively superior to outright prohibitions).
167. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
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In both Buckley and Citizens United the Court upheld disclosure provisions.
The government interests in Buckley that justified disclosure would be at least
as compelling in the context of direct democracy. Citizens United recognized the
need for transparency in the electoral process, even though that case considered
access to information more generally, not the narrow issue of the validity of the
lawmaking process. In contrast, anonymous speech cases like Talley and
Patterson tended to be decided based on the pure speech motives or
associational interests of the subject being regulated and the absence of valid
regulatory purpose. Meanwhile, disclosure cases have rejected facial First
Amendment challenges to disclosure -even when the challenged regulation is
of election campaign speech and not the lawmaking process itself. While
neither of these disclosure cases squarely considered direct democracy, the
Court has ruled on issues of disclosure in that context as well.
In 1999, the Court had the opportunity to consider disclosure laws in the
context of direct democracy in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Foundation (ACLF) .," As the following analysis shows, however, when
deciding this case, the Court misconstrued the key issues. Colorado is one of
the twenty-seven states that allow their citizens to make laws directly through
ballot initiatives.69 Colorado, like other states, imposes numerous controls and
regulations on the initiative-petition process.1o This case arose out of the
American Constitutional Law Foundation's First Amendment challenge to:
"(1) the requirement that initiative-petition circulators be registered voters; (2)
the requirement that they wear an identification badge bearing the circulator's
name; and (3) the requirement that proponents of an initiative report the
names and addresses of all paid circulators and the amount paid to each
circulator."'7 A central question in the case not squarely considered by the
Court, but relevant to the issue at the heart of this Note, is whether the
regulated activity should be seen as speech or lawmaking. The Court found all
three of the disclosure regulations to infringe inappropriately on First
Amendment rights. 72
A critique of the Court's reasoning helps develop this Note's doctrinal
argument. The majority's reasoning can be summarized as follows: "The First
Amendment (as applied to states via the Fourteenth [Amendment]) explicitly
168. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
16g. COLO. CONST. art. V, 5 1, paras. 1-3; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-101 to -135 (2010); see also
sources cited supra note 3.
170. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 5 1-40-111.
1i7. ACLF, 525 U.S. at 186 (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 187.
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protects the people's right to petition. The Colorado regulations were an
impermissible attempt to abridge this right. 'Circulating a petition is akin to
distributing a handbill,' and so the badge requirement was squarely governed
by" McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission. 17 The Court seemed to apply strict
scrutiny (although without clearly articulating any particular standard) and,
because it considered the regulated activity petition gathering, struck down the
challenged regulations.17 4 Had the lawyers arguing the case on behalf of
Colorado succeeded in framing the issue as one of state lawmaking rather than
petitioning, the outcome might have been very different-which Justice would
have gone so far as to suggest that Colorado be required to allow nonresidents
to vote, or to allow voting without identification at the polls? But the petition
for certiorari, 17 the merits briefs for Colorado,17' and the amicus briefs filed by
other state and local governments177 did not squarely set up the key distinction
between speech and lawmaking advocated here.
In essence, the challenged regulations did not restrict anonymous
petitioning or speech. The regulations simply stipulated circumstances
necessary for the petitions to count for the purposes of the state initiative
process. People who choose not to comply with state lawmaking regulations
have "no First Amendment right to insist that Colorado treat [their] petition as
anything more than a handbill."",,8 Indeed, the outcome of Supreme Court
cases considering disclosure provisions tends to depend on whether the issue is
framed as one of election regulation or of speech. Where the issue is one of a
content-neutral917  election regulation, it is easiest to find a valid government
interest.
The doctrine allowing for anonymous political speech has long been in
tension with the parallel doctrine of disclosure. First Amendment protections
for speech, expression, and association are essential rights, fundamental to
173. Akhil Reed Amar, The Five-Legged Dog, Am. LAw., Sept. 1999, at 47, 47 (quoting ACLF, 525
U.S. at 199).
174. ACLF, 525 U.S. at 186-87 (describing petition circulating as "core political speech" that
merits the full protection of the First Amendment).
175. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, ACLF, 525 U.S. 182 (No. 97-930), 1997 WL 33485681.
176. Petitioner's Brief, ACLF, 525 U.S. 182 (No. 97-930), 1998 WL 221384; Petitioner's Reply to
Brief in Opposition, ACLF, 525 U.S. 182 (No. 97-930), 1998 WL 34081105-
177. Brief of the Council of State Governments et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
ACLF, 525 U.S. 182 (No. 97-930), 1998 WL 212593; Brief of the States of Washington et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, ACLF, 525 U.S. 182 (No. 97-930), 1998 WL 221378.
178. Amar, supra note 173, at 47.
179. See Kagan, supra note 113, at 443 ("The distinction between content-based and content-
neutral regulations of speech serves as the keystone of First Amendment law.").
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American democracy. Often these rights exist even when the speaker wishes to
remain anonymous. On the other hand, the Court has often recognized the
validity of disclosure requirements in a range of electoral and legislative
contexts far broader than that of petitions in legislative referenda. Thus, First
Amendment protections for anonymous speech should not be construed to
extend to lawmaking processes such as direct democracy initiatives. In
analyzing such cases, courts look to the governmental purpose for a challenged
regulation as a key basis for determining its validity. In the context of
legislative processes and comparable aspects of campaign finance, there is a
compelling government interest in transparency and disclosure so as to ensure
the integrity of the lawmaking process. Moreover, the activity being regulated
often falls wide of the core speech activity that the Founders sought to protect
with the First Amendment. Thus, as this Part has illustrated, disclosure
doctrine provides a sound basis for recognizing the validity of disclosure in
direct democracy initiatives even if the regulations are found to implicate First
Amendment rights.
IV. PRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Court's muddled decision in Reed almost guarantees that there will be
a flourishing of litigation in lower courts addressing a range of regulatory
issues - including disclosure - in the context of state-organized ballot
initiatives and beyond. Indeed, some political groups have already filed suit in
multiple states to bypass electoral disclosure regulations."' Because the Court
erroneously applied the First Amendment in Reed, these groups will continue
to claim a right to anonymous speech in order to undermine state electoral and
lawmaking regulations. The Reed Court should have grounded its decision to
uphold the Washington state disclosure provision in an explicit distinction
between pure speech and lawmaking, bolstered by an affirmation of the states'
right to organize their own lawmaking processes. The First Amendment is vital
to the very essence of this country's identity, but so too is the sovereign
capacity of the people of each state to decide whether and how to permit
legislation by popular action. The two need not be in tension, and in future
cases the Court should rely on the distinction advocated here to clarify the
doctrine for lower courts and state governments alike.
The rich and complex history of anonymous speech and disclosure in
lawmaking provided a useful starting point for the approach advanced here.
i8o. See National Organization for Marriage To Fight Potential State-Imposed Restrictions, EWTN
NEws (Sept. 28, 2010, 11:35 AM), http://ewtnnews.com/new.php?id=1782.
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The history illuminates the breadth and depth of the issue. The historic record
also provides concrete evidence in support of the distinction between
lawmaking activity and pure speech. Foundational examples such as the
signing of the Declaration of Independence, the anonymous publishing of
written materials during the ratification debates, and the signing of the U.S.
Constitution advance this Note's argument.
The most powerful line of argument in this Note is found in the
jurisprudential analysis. The tension in Court doctrine detailed here is largely a
result of the frequent blurring of lines between core speech and association on
the one hand, and political lawmaking processes on the other. As Professor Jed
Rubenfeld writes, "There is no First Amendment 'pass' from a law whose
purpose is not to punish speech.""' If the purpose of the disputed law is not to
regulate speech, then we should question a First Amendment challenge to its
validity. As then-Professor Kagan wrote, however, "the concern with
governmental motive remains a hugely important- indeed, the most
important -explanatory factor in First Amendment law. If it does not account
for the whole world of First Amendment doctrine, it accounts (and accounts
alone) for a good part of it.""' The question of government interest remains an
essential one.
The history and doctrine alone may be insufficient: prudential
considerations may also impact a court's decision.' Thus, this final Part
considers policy implications and counterarguments. By highlighting the
unique government interest in transparency and fraud prevention and taking
on complex counterarguments, the prudential argument buttresses the historic
and doctrinal evidence.
A. State Regulation Can Promote Transparency and Deter Fraud
Distinguishing lawmaking from speech and allowing states to regulate
direct democracy initiatives, including disclosure, serves a crucial policy
interest of increasing transparency and rooting out electoral and legislative
fraud. Governments must ensure that their functioning is transparent and
credible; disclosure in direct democracy is a proven mechanism for detecting
irregularities that the state itself may fail to find.' Sunlight is indeed the best
181. Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 768.
182. Kagan, supra note 113, at 415.
183. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 59-73
(1982) (describing prudential argumentation in constitutional law).
184. See sources cited supra note 23.
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disinfectant. 8 s Without some form of disclosure, or public access to direct
democracy records and proceedings, state government could be tricked into
accepting fraudulent legislative signatures, or they could even be complicit in
such fraud. Thus disclosure serves a compelling policy interest that is essential
to the smooth functioning of the democratic process.
Critics may suggest that this Note's argument will lead down a slippery
slope to requiring disclosure in the context of voting in elections. These critics
might counter the evidence presented here to suggest that relying on
transparency in congressional proceedings to advocate transparency in direct
democracy leads to the conclusion that voting itself should be subject to the
same public scrutiny. Voting, they might say, is equally part of the lawmaking
process that this Note has argued should be subject to disclosure and should
not benefit from the full protection afforded to pure speech or expression. This
argument is unpersuasive because of crucial distinctions between signatures
gathered to activate direct democracy provisions and voting in elections.
Direct democracy initiatives are organized by public interest groups,
organizations, or civic campaigns, while elections are organized by the
government. When the government organizes an election, it has a wide range
of mechanisms to prevent fraud including registration, residence, and
identification requirements.' Voters may be required to cast their ballot at a
particular location on a particular day using a ballot designed by the
government." ' Indeed the details of each individual's voter registration history
are public.'" Not so with the direct democracy process, in which the state plays
virtually no regulatory role until the signatures are submitted. This difference
is crucial because it means that the state's overriding interest in ensuring
credibility and preventing fraud is served by disclosure in the case of direct
democracy, but not in the case of secret ballots in elections.
185. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam).
186. For a fifty-state survey of the voter registration requirements, see State by State Voter Laws
and Registration Deadlines, DEcLARE YOURSELF, http://www.declareyourself.com/voting-faq/
state-by-state-info_2.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). See also, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ELEc.
LAW § 3-102 (West 2010) (providing voter registration requirements).
187. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. 5 15.15.030 (2010) (describing the ballot design criteria); N.J. STAT.
ANN. S 19:8-7 (West 1999) (describing polling booth requirements); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
3 -4 A-9a (LexisNexis 20o6) (describing requirements for "ballot-marking accessible voting
device[s]").
188. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 29A.o8.720 (West 2005) (providing for disclosure of
voting registration records); see also Jeffrey T. Even, Washington's Address Confidentiality
Program: Relocation Assistance for Victims of Domestic Violence, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 523, 537
(1996) (stating that "voter registration lists are public records").
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Signatures on direct democracy petitions do not go to the underlying
merits of the issue in the same way that voting at the polls on the same issue or
for a particular candidate's election does. A vote expresses a political opinion on
an issue, or on the election of an individual candidate. Signing a petition,
however, is in no way binding, and it often may be difficult to predict the way
in which an individual signer will later vote. For example, some people may
support initiatives in general because of a commitment to popular sovereignty
rather than a stance on any given issue. A further example: the gay rights
activists who opposed the direct democracy campaign at issue in Reed and
sought disclosure of the signatures that gave rise to the litigation ultimately
won the vote on the merits that the contested signatures initiated.'"9 Thus,
after all the signatures were verified and the votes cast, they benefited from the
direct democracy initiative that they had initially opposed because it added
legitimacy to their position through a successful statewide vote.
Moreover, signing a lawmaking petition is entirely elective in the states
where it is even possible."' While each state has the right to allow or disallow
initiatives, the states certainly do not have the right to disallow elections and
voting. Thus while some states might choose to give citizens the option of
voting in public,' 9 ' states' ability to regulate should be more limited with
regard to voting than with regard to optional direct democracy procedures.
B. Distinguishing Between Speech and Lawmaking Will Foster Civic Discourse
Rather than legislating from the shadows of anonymity, disclosure will
encourage dialogue and debate on issues of public concern. People who have
the civic courage to speak up and sign their names will be making a powerful
statement, not necessarily on the merits of the issue, but at least on their desire
to see it resolved through public vote. Others who disagree can engage them
publicly and privately in reasoned debate. The public nature of the lawmaking
process in the legislature is crucial to the ability of elected officials to talk
through complex issues and come to sound solutions; the same is true in direct
democracy.
A counterargument to this policy benefit relates to the need to protect
potentially vulnerable minority or unpopular groups from persecution and to
i89. Lornet Turnbull, Domestic Partner Measure Kicks In, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, at Ai.
190. See sources cited supra note 3.
191. See W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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avoid chilling democratic participation or civic discourse.'92 Disclosure may
lead to harassment, threats, or intimidation of vulnerable groups, and even the
fear of harassment may have a chilling effect on participation in direct
democracy initiatives. Justice Alito invoked the specter of this harassment in
his concurrence in Reed.'93 Others might point to the history of the NAACP,
including in cases such as NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,1 9 4 in which the
Court prevented forced disclosure to protect a threatened minority group. The
petitioners in Reed invoked Patterson throughout their brief.'9 While these
concerns are valid and warrant careful consideration, they are unavailing here
for at least four reasons.
First, Patterson and its progeny did not involve lawmaking, or even voting,
but rather association. That distinction goes to the heart of the argument.
Associational rights to engage and participate in a social or political group, even
privately, are clearly protected by the First Amendment; direct participation in
the legislative process is not.
Second, the concern about harassment and intimidation is most legitimate
where the potential victims are minority groups, as was the case in Patterson.
Any group succeeding in gathering enough signatures to initiate a direct
democracy initiative and believing that it can win on the issue at the ballot is
unlikely to be a vulnerable minority. Where the group seeking to impact
legislation is so small that it is unable to gather enough signatures to get the
group's issue on the ballot, that group should probably receive the benefits of
an exemption as granted in Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign
Committee,"' and as contemplated but rejected in Buckley.'9 7 Where, however,
enough signatures are gathered to initiate a lawmaking procedure, the
overriding government interest in transparency and legitimacy should control.
Third, in certain limited circumstances a judge may find that there is an
unusually high risk of intimidation such as to warrant an injunction against
disclosure. However, that should be the exception to a presumption of
transparency.'9' A temporary injunction might be appropriate in extreme cases
where signers meet a high evidentiary standard and are able to show actual
192. See Potter, supra note 145 (describing arguments against disclosure); Disclosure and the Devil,
supra note 48, at 1105-13 (explaining how disclosure can lead to deterrence).
193. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2824 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
194. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
195. Petitioners' Brief at 26, 27, 32, Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (No. 09-559).
196. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
197. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1976) (per curiam).
198. This point is consistent with the Court's decision in Reed. See 130 S. Ct. at 2815.
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harassment or violence targeting those signing the specific petitions in question
and where traditional law enforcement has failed to provide adequate remedy.
Fourth, in the 1950s and 1960s armed groups such as the Ku Klux Klan,
sometimes with the complicity of local law enforcement, targeted groups like
the NAACP for violent attacks and intimidation.'" While America still
grapples with issues of hate-based violence,2oo minority groups generally
benefit from the protection of the state and no longer contend with the same
degree of vitriolic intimidation and attacks that were the backdrop for
Patterson. Thus, while disclosure may be a cause for concern in some extreme
cases, those are the exceptions. Because direct democracy initiatives are made
available only at the discretion of the states, it is unlikely that the same states
would seek to regulate them out of existence. Legal norms should recognize
that disclosure can lead to truth and justice by shedding light on sources of
information and lawmaking processes, thus allowing consumers of
information or government action to better engage with the marketplace of
policy, politicians, and ideas.o1
C. State Regulation and the Benefits ofPolicy Experimentation
Direct democracy procedures vary from state to state,2 o2 and thus states
should be able to experiment with methods for regulating their own
processes. 2 o3 So, for example, one state may choose to make disclosure optional
upon request by any citizen while another state may make disclosure
mandatory across the board. Still another might seek to limit disclosure to
media organizations or civic groups. Over time the strengths and weaknesses
of different regulatory and disclosure policies will emerge and other
jurisdictions can amend or adopt as appropriate.
199. See generally Sally Avery Bermanzohn, Violence, Nonviolence, and the Civil Rights Movement,
22 NEW POL. SCI. 31 (2000) (describing local government complicity with lynch mob
violence).
2oo. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, Verdict Is Manslaughter in LI. Hate Crime Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr.20, 2010, at Ai.
201. See Disclosure and the Devil, supra note 48, at 1o9-10 (laying out arguments in favor of
disclosure).
202. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68.
203. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.").
2180
120:214o 2011
PUBLIUS AND THE PETITION
Petitions can be (and often are) issues of pure speech, but not when filed to
activate a ballot initiative or lawmaking process -in this context, perhaps they
should not even be called "petitions" but rather "lawmaking signatures," or
something of the sort. In the context of a ballot initiative the state interest in
regulation is less akin to the First Amendment rights of those signing their
names and more related to state sovereignty, government transparency, and
accountability. The state has an overriding interest in detecting fraud in the
lawmaking process, and ensuring that the lawmaking process is transparent,
credible, and subject to controls of popular sovereignty. Experiences across the
country have demonstrated that the state itself may not be the only
stakeholder, or even the best suited, to detect signature fraud: disclosure allows
for a vital popular check on public and private fraud alike.2 o4
CONCLUSION
The historical, doctrinal, and prudential considerations woven together
here make a compelling case for transparency in direct democracy lawmaking
processes. The long history of anonymous speech in this country supports at
most a right to anonymous speech limited to pure speech contexts. Put
differently, laws regulating the electoral process, including the collection of
signatures on a ballot initiative, are generally misunderstood if analyzed
through the lens of First Amendment free speech. The case law that might
establish something akin to a right to anonymous speech is inapplicable in the
context of actual legislative process, and the states can rely on a robust
disclosure doctrine in implementing procedures that ensure for transparency in
lawmaking. Finally, the practical implications of this Note's argument further
support the need to distinguish pure speech from regulated steps of the direct
democracy lawmaking process.
204. See sources cited supra note 23.
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